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I. INTRODUCTION

The Detroit Public Schools (DPS) face serious challenges. Student
test scores are amongst the lowest in the nation. "Only 3 percent of
Detroit's 4th graders and 4 percent of its 8th graders meet national math
standards; experts say that our students could have done about the same
if they just guessed on the test.",2 High school dropout rates are high.
"Only 58 percent of DPS students and 78 percent of public charter
schools graduate from high school in four years. Fewer than one in four
of those students enroll in college.",3 Enrollment numbers and, therefore,
district revenues are in near free fall. 4 In the past decade, more than one
hundred thousand students have left the district and DPS has closed over
100 schools. The school system is under the control of a state appointed
Emergency Manager. Finally, the state's lowest performing schools,
many of which are in Detroit, are now being placed in a new statecontrolled Education Achievement System (EAS). 5 Enabling coherent
systems of governance and finance amidst such disparate and chaotic
forces is a daunting, if not impossible, challenge.
Into the breach, many advocate greater competition as a part of the
solution. In a competitive system, parents would be afforded an
increasing portfolio of schools from which to choose. In Michigan, this is
done by chartering Public School Academies (PSAs) and encouraging
inter-district competition through schools of choice. Schools are forced
to compete for students and, therefore, dollars. In theory, increased6
competition can create incentives to improve the quality of education.
Unfortunately, there is nothing magical about competition, in theory or

2. See EXCELLENT ScH. DET., TAKING OWNERSHIP: OUR PLEDGE TO EDUCATE ALL OF
DETROIT'S CHILDREN 3 (2010).

Only 2 percent of Detroit's high school students are prepared for college-level math and
II percent for college-level reading.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
3. See id. at 6.
4. See id. at 10.
5. Id. at9, 12.
6. CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., REPORT 364, NONTRADITIONAL K-12
SCHOOLS IN MICHIGAN 5 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter CRC, NONTRADITIONAL K-12
SCHOOLS] ("Some advocates of charter schools sought to bring the pressures of the
competitive marketplace to public education, based on the belief that by increasing
competition, charter schools would drive quality up and drive cost down.").
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practice. Depending upon how it is structured, competition can produce
either desirable or undesirable results.
The actual consequences of competition depend, in a path-dependent
manner, upon the historical context in which competition takes place, the
status of the complementary social institutions supporting the market and
the incentives that drive the system. Part II of this Article sketches the
historic setting of how markets and competition have shaped the contours
of Detroit and Southeast Michigan. An unappreciated irony in the debate
about school choice is the extent to which the problems of Southeast
Michigan can themselves be ascribed to the detrimental side effects of
competition, with a century of successive waves of industrialization and
de-industrialization. Moreover, competition in public spaces between
local governments for mobile citizens in Southeast Michigan did not
produce anything like the socially efficient equilibrium of economic
models. Rather, competition in public space actually facilitated the longterm racial and economic segregation that now defines the region. For
better or worse, school competition will be dramatically affected by these
historic forces. Returning to the present, Part 1H examines the underlying
governance and financial structure of K-12 education in Michigan. The
effects of competition will be dictated by the school finance formula of
Proposal A, which creates winner-take-all incentives. The state per-pupil
foundation allowance rewards schools not with the infra-marginal
revenue necessary to educate one additional student, but rather with a
bonus of the full average costs associated with educating any other
student in the district. School districts losing students are penalized by an
equivalent amount. This creates powerful and potentially perverse
competitive incentives. Part IV outlines the history of governance and
finance for the Detroit Public Schools. Finally, Part V explores the fate
of the Detroit Public Schools. This Article contends that the Detroit
Public Schools cannot survive the financial dynamics created by
Proposal A. School choice and competition make these dynamics worse.
In five years, it is unlikely that DPS will continue to exist in anything
like its traditional form. Competition is not a substitute for a sustainable
formula of school finance. Much more needs to be done to address the
real need of Detroit's children.
11.

HISTORICAL SE17ING: CAUTIONARY TALES OF COMPETITION IN
DETROIT

More than any other city, the story of Detroit is the story of the
competitive rise and fall of a municipality built around a single industry;
a double, if not triple boom town. Detroit is also a story of the peculiar
geography of northern racism. Each story involves competition. Each
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story also illustrates how choice never takes place in a vacuum and how
playing fields are seldom level. In America, differences in wealth,
mobility and race always matter.
A. Competition, Globalizationand De-Industrializationin Southeast
Michigan
Today, the dynamics of de-industrialization are apparent to
everyone. Financial capital is more mobile than labor, and physical space
(real property) is the least mobile thing of all. Dollars follow opportunity.
Low labor costs create industrial profit potential and manufacturing
plants (and jobs) move overseas. This is nothing new to Detroit residents.
De-industrialization started here over sixty years ago, with plants moving
first to green spaces and suburbs within the state, then to lower cost labor
markets in other states, before finally transplanting themselves abroad.
But de-industrialization is only part of the story. In detailing the "Origins
of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit," Thomas
Sugrue gives equal significance to racial discrimination in employment
7
and housing (each themselves artificial restrictions on market mobility).
Like glaciers in the ice age, these forces have shaped the geographic
and cultural landscape of Southeast Michigan.
Origins was an attempt to bridge the structural and the cultural to start with important questions asked by whiteness scholars,
but to provide a more rigorous account of the mechanisms that
perpetuated racial differences in ideology and experience. Urban
inequality, I argued, is the result of the mapping of
understandings of racial differences onto the geography of a city
- and to the power of categories of racial difference to create
racial hierarchies that shaped housing patterns, workplace
practices, private investment, and the public policies that
reinforced them. Above all, I contended racial inequalities persist
because of the mutual reinforcing processes of ideology and
political economy, of identity and self-interest.8
This analysis presents a number of challenges to economists. In theory, a
perfectly competitive market should help end, not perpetuate
7. THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN
POSTWAR DETROIT xviii (Princeton Classic ed. 2005) ("Any one of [these forces] would

have had devastating consequences, but the combined effect of all three reshaped
American cities in ways that still affect us today").
8. Id. at xx.
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discrimination in housing and employment. Population density maps of
Detroit based on the 1950 census show incredibly high rates of density
(the highest rates anywhere in the city) in the areas popularly known as
Black Bottom and Paradise Valley. 9 These levels of density would be
consistent with the existence of high-rise, multi-family dwelling units
that are found in other large urban areas; yet another distinguishing
feature about Detroit is the near absence of any such housing structures. 0
The truth is that these areas of high density marked the narrow
boundaries of the Black ghettos, individuals forced into some of the
city's most poorly maintained, multiply divided and unsafe housing
stock.
To add economic insult to injury, in this period it "was not unusual
for blacks to pay twenty to forty percent more for rent than whites in
equivalent apartments."" In a perfectly competitive market, white
landlords should have been clamoring to cater to such pent-up demand
by offering better housing at lower prices to the residents of Black
Bottom and Paradise Valley. We all know that this did not happen.
Rather than demonstrating efficiency, economics here provide an
implicit measure of the extreme depth of the racial discrimination that
existed to create and perpetuate these invisible geographic boundaries.
Sadly, these perverse dynamics can create self-reinforcing vicious cycles.
The process of housing segregation set into motion a chain
reaction that reinforced patterns of racial inequality. Blacks were
poorer than whites, and they had to pay more for housing, thus
deepening their relative impoverishment. In addition, they were
confined to the city's oldest housing stock, 12in most need of
ongoing maintenance, repair and rehabilitation.
The ability or inability to purchase quality-housing stock, in turn, has
been the principle means in this country of building wealth in one
generation and transferring that wealth to future generations. The effects
of discrimination and inequality structurally move from one generation
9. KURT METZGER, DATA DRIVEN DET. (D3), METROPOLITAN DETROIT'S DIVERSE
POPULATION: A CLOSER LOOK 13 (2011) (Presentation to Legislators in the "D" with
DTE), http://datadrivendetroit.org/web-ftp/Presentations/DOlDTE_7_201 1_small.pdf.

10. SUGRUE, supra note 7, at 20-21 ("Detroit had virtually no tall buildings. Unlike its
east coast counterparts, Detroit lacked both tenements and high-rise apartments. Only
1.3% of the city's residential structures were apartment buildings."). Detroit was the
kingdom of small, single family homes. Indeed, another feature of Detroit was its staunch
and often violent opposition to federally subsidized public housing. Id. at 86.
11. Id. at54.

12. Id. at 36.
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to the next. An identical story could be told about the paradoxes of
economics and discrimination in labor markets.
Why is any of this relevant in an article about public school
governance, finance and competition? First, it serves as an important foil
to how the word "competition" often works at an ideological level in
public discourse. Repeated use of the word "competition" cognitively
primes the policy making brain in this country to be thinking in terms of
"efficiency" and "optimality." In truth, depending upon the
circumstances, competition can be good or bad, efficient or inefficient,
desirable or undesirable. Even the very word "competition" can have
many different meanings in different contexts. Competition can be
associated with the social welfare maximizing general equilibrium of
neoclassical economics. Competition can also imply the "creative
destruction" commonly associated with Joseph Schumpeter,' 3 where
progress to the next stage of competition unavoidably requires the
destruction of the previous stage (perhaps a more apt metaphor for the
history of Detroit). In debates about competition in public schools, we
need to be more conscious of the many different meanings that
competition can have.
Second, the history of Detroit (especially as it relates to race)
illustrates how competition in practice may not work like the theoretical
models predict. The ultimate effects of competition will depend upon
local context and how the market is structured. Moreover, no market can
be understood apart from social, political and economic contexts in
which it is nested. The teaching of modem institutional economics is that
the market itself is a social institution, with no clear dividing line
between public and private. 14 The complex forces perpetuating housing
segregation in Detroit illustrate this point. Since the adoption of New
Deal policies, the market for housing has been driven by the availability
of federally insured mortgages. Federal housing programs, however,
expressly incorporated discriminatory standards as a matter of public
policy. 5 Federal policies, in turn, were supported by the discriminatory
work of private real-estate associations and policed on the ground by
often violent neighborhood improvement associations. In the end, the
market itself became the primary rationalization for discrimination, with
claims that blacks moving into white neighborhoods would cause
property values to fall. Here, the market became an efficient enforcer of
the racial prejudices of landowners. Finally, the social, political and
13. See JOSEPH SCHUMPTER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
14. Peter J. Hammer, The Architecture of Health Care Markets: Economic Sociology
andAntitrust Law, 7 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 227, 229 (2007).
15. See generally SUGRUE, supra note 7, at ch. 2, 7 and 8.
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economic forces detailed by Sugrue define the facts on the ground that
we now face. No intelligent discussion of social policy in Detroit can
happen on a blank slate; all such discussions must understand and
appreciate this history. However policies over school governance,
finance and competition play out in the Detroit Public Schools, they will
play out in the context of the extreme forms of inequality and racial
segregation that now define the city landscape and the entire
metropolitan area. These factors must be acknowledged as centrally
important and not pushed to the margins.
B. Competition in PublicSpaces and Racial Segregation in Southeast
Michigan
How should we think about competition in public spaces? In 1956,
Charles Tiebout projected theories of private competition into the public
space of competition between local municipalities.' 6 In theory, with the
satisfaction of appropriate assumptions - perfect information and perfect
(costless) mobility - citizens will sort themselves into communities that
match their economic preferences.' 7 Furthermore, local municipalities
will have positive incentives to compete with each other for residents.
How has this competition played out in Southeast Michigan? The past is
still with us. The 2000 census revealed that the Detroit Metropolitan
Area was the most racially segregated metropolitan area in the country. 18
No one would pretend that this outcome is either efficient or just. Often,
the power of a theoretical model is to help reveal why the reality we
observe is so different from what the theory would predict. There are
important processes of social reproduction at work. A half-century later,
16. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
17. CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., REPORT 369, REFORM OF K-12 SCHOOL
DISTRICT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT IN MICHIGAN 9 (May 2011) [hereinafter CRC,

REFORM OF K-12 SCHOOL DISTRICT GOVERNANCE] ("This relates to the Tiebout
hypothesis, which states that competition among local communities leads to efficiency in
the provision of public goods. In other words, people will 'vote with their feet' and move
to the school district that provides their desired level of school services and their desired
level of taxation.") (internal citation omitted). See also RAJASHRI CHAKRABARTI &
JOYDEEP Roy, EFFECT OF CONSTRAINTS ON TIEBOUT COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM

MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (2010) (applying the Tiebout model to school
finance reform in Michigan and finding that Proposal A reduced competition and effort in
the highest spending school districts).
18. Based on the 2000 Census, Detroit was the most racially segregated metropolitan
area in the country. By 2010, Detroit had fallen to fourth place. Metro Detroit No Longer
Most Segregated, DET. NEWS, Mar. 29, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/detroit/metrodetroit-no-longer-most-segregated- 143407993.html.
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the same pattern revealed by the 1950 census map illustrating the
complete racial segregation between blacks and whites within the city of
Detroit has been reproduced at a regional level. The story involves many
of the same forces leading to the initial segregation of Detroit, such as
discrimination in housing and economic opportunity. The story also
reveals the ways in which the lack of perfect mobility permits Tieboutlike sorting along dimensions other than efficiency. Again, public policy
played a significant role. Federal highway systems simultaneously
decimated African-American neighborhoods in Detroit and facilitated the
exit of whites from the city, as did the continuation of federally
subsidized housing loans. The lack of any meaningful system of regional
public transportation created additional barriers separating the city from
the suburbs.
Municipalities did compete with each other, but not in ways that
furthered equity and efficiency.
Suburbabization exacerbated the impact of boundary drawing
and neighborhood defensiveness that shaped the post-war city. In
fact, suburban governments often acted as super-neighborhood
associations, using their governmental powers to enforce zoning
laws that relentlessly excluded low- and moderate-income
"outsiders," disproportionately people of color. They fiercely
resisted intergovernmental cooperation, staunchly defended the
age-old principle of local control, and relied on local taxes to
fund local public works, social services, and de facto private
schools.19
One of the most important questions facing Southeast Michigan is why
competition between public entities has persistently compounded rather
than remedied economic and racial inequality. In some respects, Detroit
is not substantially different from other rustbelt cities of the north Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Each city struggled in
different ways with the forces of de-industrialization and discrimination
in housing and employment. Each still suffers some of the same ills as
Detroit in terms of racial and economic segregation. At the same time,
the problems of Detroit appear to consistently be a full standard
deviation more severe than the problems of these other cities. Why is this
so?

19. SUGRUE, supra note 7, at xxi.
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The work of David Rusk points in the right direction.2 ° The problem
returns to questions of law, geography, competition and unintended
consequences. The ability of Southeast Michigan to fracture into a
myriad of economically and racially segregated fiefdoms has its origins
in state laws defining the powers of state, county and local governments.
Rusk speaks of distinctions between county-states and township-states,
and between "big box" states and "little box" states. Michigan is at the
extreme of the Township-state and "little box" state categories. What this
means intuitively is that state law has vested tremendous power at the
most local of local levels. In essence, every city, municipality and
charter-township can do anything they want within their own borders. In
this system, territory is inviolable, making annexation nearly impossible.
In terms of regional cooperation, every local government has a veto
right. When one realizes that Southeast Michigan is not only one of the
most racially segregated areas of the country, but is also one of the most
fractured regions in terms of the sheer number of local governments, one
starts to appreciate the real dimensions of the problem. If an economist
were to model the question of regional cooperation in Southeast
Michigan as a bargaining problem, the dominant prediction would be
continued stalemate.
This is a problem for everyone in the region. Racial segregation and
regional segregation are unavoidably connected with economic
segregation. Southeast Michigan is not only one of the most racially
segregated regions in the country; it is also one of the most economically
segregated areas of the country. There is no shortage of competition
between separate and isolated public municipalities. Different
municipalities compete with each other to attract and retain sports teams,
corporate headquarters and new businesses. Sadly, competition can be
good or bad, depending upon how it is structured. Competition can create
incentives to "race to the top" or to "race to the bottom." In Michigan,
competition in public spaces has not created anything like the efficient
equilibria predicted in Tiebout's models. Rather, competition in public
spaces in Southeast Michigan has created continued divisiveness.
Competition can also create islands of wealth and islands of poverty.
Detroit is a fiefdom increasingly isolated from the rest of the region.
Detroit has a declining tax base and a declining population base; trend
lines that can be traced back to the 1950s with the beginning phases of
de-industrialization. Detroit has extremely high rates of poverty and
unemployment. Finally, and not surprisingly, Detroit has a struggling
20. DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS: A CENSUS 2000 UPDATE (3rd ed. 2003);
see also David Rusk, Changing the "Rules of the Game": Tools to Revive Michigan's
FracturedMetropolitan Regions, 13 J.L. Soc'Y 197 (2012).
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school system. To understand the challenges facing the Detroit Public
Schools, we must first lay the foundation for understanding the school
governance, finance and competition policies in Michigan more
generally.
Ill. SCHOOL GOVERNANCE, FINANCE AND COMPETITION IN MICHIGAN
The Citizens Research Council of Michigan (CRC) has published a
number of recent reports on the state of public K-I 2 education. "Public
Education Governance in Michigan" describes the "complex political
environment" in which school governance operates, as well as the
overlapping domains of shared authority amongst numerous actors.2'
Education policy is a complicated puzzle where the different pieces of
policy, governance, service delivery and finance must all fit together in a
coherent fashion. The puzzle analogy, however, is imperfect and
incomplete. Better metaphors for complex systems come from the fields
of engineering, hydraulics and ecology. Education, like health care,
might best be approached as a complex adaptive system.22 To understand
a complex adaptive system, one must appreciate notions of high levels of
interconnectedness, indirect and multiple forms of causation, and the role
of feedback mechanisms. Moreover, one needs to develop a keen
awareness of the possibility of unintended consequences, all in a context
that is dynamic and changing, not static.
A. Michigan'sSchool Governance System
Multiple, overlapping domains of authority from the federal - to the
state - to the local level characterize school governance in Michigan and
the rest of the United States.2 3 Plenary authority for education finance

21. CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., REPORT 359, PUBLIC EDUCATION
GOVERNANCE IN MICHIGAN 44 (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter CRC, PUBLIC EDUCATION
GOVERNANCE].
22. See ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH POL'Y & SYSTEMS RESEARCH, SYSTEMS THINKING FOR

HEALTH SYSTEMS STRENGTHENING (Don de Savigny & Taghreed Adam eds., 2009)
(applying theories of complex adaptive systems to health system development). Similar
theories have been applied by the Kirwan Institute to the problem of structural racism.
See STEPHEN MENENDIAN & CAITLIN WA'Tr, KIRWAN INST., SYSTEMS PRIMER (2008).
23. This discussion focuses primarily on the role that traditional school districts play
in providing services to traditional students, in order to establish a baseline for
considering the competitive dynamics introduced by schools of choice and charter
schools. Moreover, the discussion focuses almost exclusively on systems for determining
resource allocation, rather than issues such as curricular content. As such, many
important issues, such as the role of the federal government in education, the
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and organization in Michigan rests with the state legislature. While much
of this authority has been historically delegated to local school districts
(and more recently to Public School Academies), the legislature has "the
authority to abolish local school districts if it so chooses."2 4 Indeed, the
trend in Michigan has been toward greater centralization of school
finance, calendars and curricular decisions. The most extreme example
of centralized state control can be found in the laws enabling Emergency
Managers and the creation of the new Education Achievement System
(EAS), a centralized state district for low performing schools.
The State Board of Education is a quasi-independent body created by
the State Constitution.25 While the Board is designated to "serve as the
general planning and coordinating body for all public education and to
have leadership and general supervision responsibilities over all public
education, except public universities," in practice, it serves more of a
consultative and advisory role, with little active policy making or
implementing authority. 26 The Superintendent of Public Education is
appointed by the Governor, but serves at the pleasure of the State Board
of Education. 27 The Superintendent acts as the non-voting chair of the
State Board of Education, as well as the Executive Director of the
Michigan Department of Education (MDE). 2' As an executive agency,
MDE has responsibility for implementing bills passed by the legislature
and the policies established by the State Board of Education. In addition,
MDE administers state school aid payments, distributes federal grants,
oversees local school districts and provides technical and programmatic
support to local schools.
While public education is constitutionally a state responsibility, the
actual delivery of educational services is typically delegated to local
school districts, "which can be thought of as distinct, special-purpose
units of local government., 29 Local school districts are units of
governance separate from municipal governance. Complicating matters
further, the boundaries of local school districts are often not coterminous
with the boundaries of other units of local government. "As of FY2009,
Michigan had 551 traditional local school districts (excluding PSAs,

complexities of special education, the role of Intermediate School Districts and debates
over pedagogy will be neglected. What remains is challenging enough.
24. CRC, PUBLIC EDUCATION GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 4.
25. Id.
26. !d.at 5.
27. Id.at 6.
28. Id. An organizational chart outlining Michigan's State Educational Governance
Model is available. Id.at 4 (Chart i).
29. Id.at 9.
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which are also considered to be local districts). ' 30 Local school districts
are responsible for implementing the mechanics for delivering
educational services. The annual operating budgets for local school
districts, however, are largely set at the state level, determined by the
annual foundation allowance for the district multiplied by the number of
students enrolled in the district. Subject to this externally imposed budget
constraint, local school districts make allocation decisions and set
spending priorities. In addition, local school districts hire the local
superintendent, approve labor contracts, provide an oversight function
and help implement policies handed down from state and federal
authorities. 3'
Significantly, operating expenses and capital expenses are governed
separately in Michigan. Since 1994, the state has centralized control for
determining and financing the operating revenues available to local
districts. 32 Local districts, however, retain authority to determine
and
33
finance (through local property taxes) their capital requirements.
Michigan has been on the vanguard of the charter school movement.
Since 1993, folded over this system of traditional school districts has
been a system of Public School Academies (PSAs) or charter schools.
PSAs "are public schools organized as nonprofit corporations under the
Michigan Nonprofit Corporation Act.",34 As of FY2009, there were 232
PSAs operating in the state. 35 Subject to various restrictions, PSAs can be
chartered by the boards of local school districts, Intermediate School
Districts (ISDs), community colleges and state universities. The
chartering authority is responsible for providing oversight and
accountability. "PSAs are considered to be local school districts and their
main functions are similar to traditional districts, including directing and
developing policy within the district and implementing local, state and
federal policies." 36 PSAs are not bound by the collective bargaining
30. CRC, PUBLIC EDUCATION GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 9.

31. Id.
at 12.
32. Id.
at 15-16.
33. Id.
at 12, 16.
34. Id.
at 18.
35. Id. at 18. In some respects, PSAs operate as school districts without geographic
borders. This gives them the strategic advantage of the ability to choose their location.
Charter schools have targeted students in urban school districts. Fifty charter schools are
located in Detroit. CRC, NONTRADITIONAL K-12 SCHOOLS, supra note 6, at 14. Other
charters will choose to locate just outside the city-center district, yet draw a majority of
their students from the urban district. See David Arsen & Yongmei Ni, The Effects of
Charter School Competition on School District Allocation, 20 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 1, 11
(2011) (For example, many charter schools located in suburban districts just outside
central cities draw a large share of their students from the central cities.).
36. CRC, PUBLIC EDUCATION GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 18.
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agreements of the local district in which they operate.37 Moreover, even
though they are nonprofit corporations, PSAs can "contract with private
education service providers (ESPs) to provide teachers who are
considered to be private employees of the ESP rather than public
employees of the PSA.,, 38 ESPs may be either nonprofit or for-profit
are not required to provide transportation
entities. Furthermore, PSAs
39
services to their students.

Competition may itself be considered an instrumentality of public
governance. Since 1996, Michigan has also liberalized its rules
governing inter-district school choice. 40 While not mandatory and
subject to certain regulations, local school districts may enroll students
from other local districts. Districts are prohibited from trying to selfselect students on the basis of particular characteristics. Districts are not
required to provide transportation to non-district students. However,
local districts cannot restrict students in their own geographic domain
from enrolling elsewhere. Under state rules, dollars follow students.
When either PSAs or local districts enroll students from another district,
they receive the full state foundation allowance for the operating
expenses associated with that student.4' Competition is not a trivial or
small scale experiment in Michigan. Statewide, the schools of choice
program enrolled nearly 80,000 students in FY2009, representing five
percent of students across the state and the transfer of $594 million in
state funds through the foundation allowance.42 PSAs enrollment is even
greater, serving six percent of all students statewide in FY 2009.4 School
competition is a billion dollar industry in Michigan.
B. Michigan'sSchool Finance System
This section examines how schools are financed in Michigan and
how the structure of school finance affects decision-making. Equity in
school finance has been a central issue in education policy for the past
half century, but "equity" is a complicated concept with multiple
dimensions. There is a tendency for legislators to seize on just one aspect
of equity for policy-making purposes, often to the neglect of others.
37. Id. at 19 (Table 7).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 21 (Table 7).
40. Id. at 16-17.
41. Id. at 16, 20 (Table 7). In recent years, the total amount of the state foundation
allowance a PSA can receive has been capped at $7,580. CRC, NONTRADITIONAL K-12
SCHOOLS, supra note 6 at 12.
42. CRC, PUBLIC EDUCATION GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 17.
43. Id. at 18.
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While most can agree that the quality of educational opportunities a child
receives should not be determined by their zip code and place of birth,
geography remains destiny in defining educational opportunities in
Michigan. Before 1994, education in Michigan was financed largely
through local property taxes. 44 The state intervened in this era through a
"power equalization" program to provide direct subsidies to districts with
the lowest property values. 45 An important aspect of the earlier policies
was to channel additional state funds to school districts in impoverished
urban centers. 46 This addressed one form of inequality (disparate
property values), but neglected others. Disparities in absolute levels of
spending (rural districts versus wealthy suburban districts) remained
wide in the state and were growing.
In 1994, Michigan voters approved Proposal A and ushered in a new
era of school finance. The proposal shifted primary responsibility for
funding school operating expenses from local property taxes to state
revenue sources, including an increased state sales tax.47 Proposal A was
designed to address the dimension of inequality defined in terms of
absolute spending levels. 48 That said, it is a common misperception that
state per-pupil funding in the wake of Proposal A was equalized.4 9 In
44. CITIZEN'S RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., REPORT 371, STATE AND LOCAL
REVENUES FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION IN MICHIGAN I (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter CRC, STATE

AND LOCAL REVENUES]. ("Prior to the approval of Proposal A in March 1994, the
responsibility for funding schools and the decisions regarding annual resource levels
were the province of local officials and residents.").
45. CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., REPORT 371, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID
TO MICHIGAN SCHOOLS 7-8 (Aug. 2011) [hereinafter CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID].
46. Id. at 48 ("some large districts located in poor central cities benefitted from higher
taxes and more state aid, resulting in higher per-pupil revenues prior to Proposal A.").
See also id. at 54.
47. CRC, STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES, supra note 44, at 3. Proposal A constituted a
dramatic shift in state/local funding. In FY1994, state spending accounted for thirty-one
percent of operating revenue, while local revenue accounted for sixty-two percent. In

FYI995, the state percentage of operating revenue was seventy-one, with the local level
falling to twenty-three percent. Id. at 11 (Chart 2). The centralization of funding is also a
centralization of control, "[F]or all intents and purposes," the education system in
Michigan "is best characterized as almost entirely state-run in terms of the level of
operating revenues available each year." Id. at 13.
48. Id. at 5 ("A primary goal of this effort was to address the per-pupil financial
disparities that existed under the pre-1993 funding model.").
49. CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 9 ("There is a common
misperception, perhaps because the term 'foundation,' that all schools receive the same
amount. The reality is that foundation grants vary in size across school districts in the
state, which has been the case since the implementation of the foundation program."). See
also CRC, STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES, supra note 44, at 57 ("The reforms sought
relative per-pupil funding equity, not absolute equity, and thus the goal was to narrow,
not eliminate, the gap that existed between districts.").
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many respects, Proposal A simply ratified existing forms of absolute
a soft commitment to try to
inequality into the state finance formula, with
50
narrow the bands of inequality over time.
Systems of school finance establish the parameters for local
decision-making and dictate what is and is not possible. There are a
number of structural oddities in how schools are financed in Michigan.
To begin with, Proposal A only addresses operating expenses. The state
determines the level of funding available for operating revenues, but
local control is retained over all capital planning and financing.51 This
immediately hamstrings efforts at establishing equity in any broad or
universal sense. The inequalities embedded in vastly disparate local
property bases are retained for capital planning. 52 There are other
important implications. The separation of operating and capital expenses
makes rational planning difficult, especially in the intermediate and long
term. The hallmark of a well-functioning system is the ability to engage
in full cost accounting. Moreover, the ability for some districts to be able

50. CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 10 ("The most influential
factor on determining a district's initial foundation grant was the amount of per-pupil
revenues it received just prior to the implementation of the foundation grant; the total
(state and local) per-pupil revenue each district received in FY1994. The per-pupil
revenue in FY1994 reflected the property wealth disparities that existed at the time.")
(internal citation omitted).
51. Id. at 9; see also CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH. & MICH. STATE UNIV.,
EDUC. POL'Y CTR., ADEQUACY, EQUITY AND CAPITAL SPENDING IN MICHIGAN SCHOOLS:

THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF PROPOSAL A I (May 2005) [hereinafter CRC & EDUC.
POL'Y CTR., THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF PROPOSAL A] ("One critical element of

Michigan's public school system remains an exclusively local responsibility, however.
The revenues for school construction and other capital spending comes almost entirely
from local property taxes, which must be approved by local voters.").
52. CRC & EDUC. POL'Y CTR., THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF PROPOSAL A, supra note
51, at I ("Leaving responsibility for capital spending at the local level perpetuates wide
variation in the quality of educational facilities provided in Michigan's public school
system."). The disparities are dramatic. "In 29 of Michigan's wealthiest districts, the perpupil value of property is more than $500,000. In 75 districts, in contrast, the per-pupil
value of taxable property is less than $100,000. In six districts, including Detroit, the perpupil value of taxable property is less than $50,000." Id. at 4. "The residents of Highland
Park can never provide the educational facilities available to students in Bloomfield Hills,
even if they tax themselves at extremely high rates." Id. at 4-5. The equity issues are also
stark. Residents of poorer school districts tax themselves at dramatically higher rates and
yet raise substantially lower levels of revenue than their wealthier counterparts. Id. at 1819. "''he residents of Detroit levy nearly fourteen mills, the highest rate in Michigan.
With very low values of taxable property per-pupil, however, even these high millage
rates produce relatively small amounts of revenue for capital investment." Id. at 18. The
report concludes that, "[c]apital spending is that the unfinished business of Proposal A."
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to invest differentially higher levels in their facilities can create perverse
dynamics in the competitive process. s3
There are other problems as well. The Michigan system creates a
schism or a mismatch between those that set the budget (the state
legislature) and those that make the actual spending decisions (the local
school district).5 4 Budgeting should be part of an organic, learning
process that seeks to match needs with revenue. While the structural
separation of these functions is not necessarily fatal, it needs other
administrative processes where the information held by local decision
makers is transmitted to the state decision makers for planning purposes.
Sadly, such mechanisms are not well established. Indeed, one of the
central criticisms of the Michigan approach has been the failure to have
any substantive notion of the basic needs that define the content of
financing decisions. "At no time during the design or implementation of
the foundation grant, and at no time since, has there been an explicit
attempt to quantify what constitutes a basic education. 5 5 This is one
consequence of focusing on the abstract dimension of absolute spending
disparities. A myopic focus on simply equalizing absolute levels of perpupil spending does not consider issues such as potential disparities in
the costs of providing educational services across districts or similar
disparities in meeting the educational needs of disparate populations of
students.5 6 The needs of different student populations are not always the
53. Id. at 6-7 ("Most significantly, some high-wealth communities have built new
state-of-the-art schools, at least partly in order to attract non-resident students and the
educational revenue that they bring with them from neighboring school districts.").
54. CRC, STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES, supra note 44, at 14 ("Although the school
finance reforms concentrated revenue-raising decisions at the state capitol in Lansing,
spending decisions remain the province of local school districts.").
55. CRC, DIsTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 42; see also Tom Watkins,
Structural Issues Surrounding Michigan School Finance in the 21st Century: A Call for
Dialogue, Input and Action (Dec. 6, 2004) (unpublished report submitted to the Michigan
State Board of Education), www.michigan.gov/.../michiganschoolfundinglS
108037.pdf
("The 'foundation allowance' introduced in Proposal A differed from district to district
and was based on how much revenue per child each district received before Proposal A.
It did not consider whether the level of funding was adequate to provide a sound
education.").
56. "Proposal A aimed to reduce inequalities in revenues, but it took virtually no
account of differences in the costs of providing educational services. If policy makers
seek to encourage efficiency across a system of schools, then state funding must account
for differences in the costs that local districts confront." DAVID ARSEN & DAVID N.
PLANK, MICH. STATE UNIV. COLLEGE OF EDUC. & EDUC. POL'Y CTR., MICHIGAN SCHOOL
FINANCE UNDER PROPOSAL A: STATE CONTROL, LOCAL CONSEQUENCE 25 (Nov. 2003).
This can be a serious problem. "However, because the costs of educating children vary
considerably based on student characteristics, local labor markets and other relevant
factors, absolute equalization may require that some districts receive more state aid than
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same. These dimensions of equity, as well as their fundamental
budgetary significance, do not play a significant role in the analysis.57
The Michigan funding formula is relatively simple. The revenue any
local district receives is the product of the state "foundation allowance"
(a number that will vary district-by-district) and the number of students
enrolled in the district - pupil membership. 58 That product defines almost
the entire operating budget that the district will receive for the coming
year. Ninety percent of the state School Aid Fund is disbursed through
the foundation allowance. 59 The operating budget will change as the level
of the foundation allowance changes relative to other cost considerations
and as student enrollments change from year-to-year.
The regime established by Proposal A has been in place now for
more than 16 years. This is sufficient time to assess some of its long-term
trends and consequences. Absolute disparities in operating expenses have
been reduced, but not eliminated. The gap has been narrowed by placing
a soft cap on the allowance of higher spending school districts, while
6
seeking to raise the floor on lower spending school districts. 0 As a
result, the gap in the state foundation allowance has been reduced from
$2,300 in FY1995 to $1,277 in FY 2007.61 The actual disparity, however,
is greater when one considers that the highest spending districts in 1994
were "held harmless" and are able to spend greater amounts than the
state allowance, financed through local property taxes. 62 "The spread

others to ensure that all students receive the same education." CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF
STATE AID, supra note 45, at 5 (citing Andrew Reschovsky, FinancialEqualizationand
State Finance, NAT'L TAX J., Mar. 1994).
57. CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 42 ("[N]o attempt has been
made to account for cost differences across districts.").
58. Id. at 13.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id. at 11 ("Thus, leveling down was not considered politically feasible. A more
acceptable approach involved raising the revenue provided to districts at the bottom of
the per-pupil revenue spectrum by increasing revenue to these districts by the greatest
amount").
61. Id. at 19 (Table 3). This reflects a narrowing of the gap in direct state support. It
does not reflect continued differences in support to the hold harmless districts.
62. CRC, STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES, supra note 44, at 6 ("In addition to these
primary operating taxes, state law allowed some higher-spending districts to levy
additional mills, known as 'hold harmless' mills, to maintain their higher spending."); see
also CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 12 ("Districts above $6,500 per
pupil were required to raise the difference entirely from a separate millage, called the
hold harmless tax that was subject to voter approval."). This approach permits significant
disparities to continue. In FY1999, for example, Bloomfield Hills spent $10,916 perpupil, while the City of Harper Woods spent $6,946 per-pupil. Id. at 16 (Table 2).
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between the highest and lowest revenue districts in FY2009 was $5,000
per-pupil.'63

By focusing on absolute funding levels as the primary dimension of
equity, Proposal A has neglected other aspects of equity, such as poverty.
"Thus, the state's policies to raise the bottom have not had the direct
affect of increasing funding for districts serving the state's poorest
populations." 64 Similarly, whether measured in terms of race 65 or urban
status, 66 school districts with greatest relative need have not faired as
well as other districts under the current system. Other state spending
trends illustrate the challenges that all local school districts face. State
spending in recent years has struggled to keep pace with inflation.
Moreover, when one considers the high proportion of local operating
budgets devoted to personnel costs and the role of ever raising retirement
and health care costs, there are fewer and fewer relative dollars to spend
on direct educational expenses now than there were sixteen years ago.67
The amount of the foundation allowance is just half of the equation
determining a local district's operating revenue. The other half of the
equation is enrollment, or the pupil membership. Proposal A was
designed in an era of increasing enrollment. No thought was given the
potentially detrimental effects the formula could have in an era where
many school districts are experiencing falling enrollments. 68 State school
enrollment peaked in 2003 and has been declining ever sense. 69 There are
a number of causes of falling district enrollment - declining birth rates,
out-migration from the state, intra-state migration and increased school
competition.70 Inner-city schools and small rural districts face the
greatest challenges from a declining student base.7 ' The school districts
63. CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 62.

64. Id.at 48.
65. Id. at 54 ("When growth in foundation grants across districts is examined through
a racial composition lens, districts with the highest percentage of African American
students have fared the worst.").
66. Id. at 55 (Table 18). "Detroit and Flint, for example, both experiences enrollment
declines of greater than 40 percent between FY1995 and FY2009, contributing to total
funding revenues declines of 42 percent and 46 percent, respectively." Id. at 57.
67. Id. at 27 ("Over the entire 16-year period, the real value of the grant, adjusted for
the employer contribution increase, rose from $7,180 in FY1995 to $8,012 in FY2002,
before falling to $7,029 in FY20 10.").
68. CRC, DisTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 35 ('The current foundation
program was developed in an era of rising enrollments and little attention was given to
the fiscal effects of declining enrollments within the structure of the program.").
69. Id. at 28, 29 (Chart 8) ("Since FY2003, statewide enrollments face exhibited an
unabated decline.").
70. Id. at 30-31.
7 I.
Id. at 37.
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with the largest continued increases in enrollment tend to be suburban
schools with above average median incomes.72 The demographic
pressures of declining student populations faced by urban
school districts
73
have been exacerbated by the growth of charter schools.
Without question, the manner in which the school finance formula
has been designed and implemented has amplified, not reduced, the
trauma experienced by school districts with declining student
populations. The most damaging aspect is the manner in which revenue
is calculated in terms of average costs per student. This is not rocket
science. The dynamics of the problem are intuitive and readily apparent.
"In the short-run, the marginal costs of losing a student are far greater
than the average cost of educating the student. This can place a strain on
local budgets because annual enrollment losses generally cannot be
translated into immediate cost reductions that match the per-pupil
funding loss." ' 74 These negative consequences are only partially offset by
the weighted formula for calculating the pupil membership. The blended
formula weights the enrollment of the current fall semester with that of
the spring of the previous year. While the weights have fluctuated over
time, the typical weight was in the range of 75/25.75 The real problem
with this approach, however, is that a two year time frame is far too short
a period to manage the transition of falling populations and to offset the
harshness inherent in the average per-pupil calculation of operating
revenue. Sadly, the weights of the blend have been recently changed in a
manner that will only increase the financial stress of declining
enrollments.76
State policy has attempted to address some of the inequalities of the
foundation allowance program through categorical funding. For example,
72. Id. at 39.
73. Id. at 38 ("Most of Michigan's charter schools are located in urban areas, which
will explain some of the enrollment declines in central cities.").
74. CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 31-34. The converse is also
true. "Under the foundation allowance program, it is much easier to manage up (i.e.,
accommodate growing enrollments) than it is to manage down." Id. at 34. Labor is just
one illustration of sticky costs in the short term. CRC, STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES,
supra note 44, at 45 ("Because of the high concentration of personnel spending, the
options for effecting major spending reductions are limited. Personnel costs tend to be
'sticky' in the short-term and intermediate reductions are difficult to achieve because of
multi-year
collective
bargaining
agreements
determine
overall
employee
compensation.").
75. CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 30.

76. Id. at 30 ("Beginning with the FY2012 Budget the weighings will change course
again, but this time to a 90 percent/10 percent blend. This shift will allow growing
districts to more fully benefit (in funding terms) from the additional students. Conversely,
the enrolment losses in declining districts will not be smoothed as much.").
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in FY2007, the state adopted a program to provide higher levels of
support for school districts with declining enrollments.77 The problem is
that this mandate was never fully funded. "In FY201 1, eligible districts
will receive a prorated declining enrolment grant equal to about eight
percent of the full amount allowed under state law. Given the significant
proration, the supplemental payments have not been able to make up for
the revenue losses declining enrollment districts experience. ,,78 Similar
categorical funding is supposed to target "at-risk" students.79 In fact,
while the real needs of these children have increased steadily from
FY2003-FY2010,
"the real value of at-risk payment declined by [thirty8°
four] percent.
State action is the sum of continuous incremental choices that define
the character of the whole. The inherently unequal maximum foundation
grants have always been fully funded (necessarily sending
disproportionately more money to some of the wealthiest school
districts). The money for "declining districts" and "at risk" populations
has not been similarly appropriated. The state's values are defined by the
state's choices. State financing continues to be dominated by the
foundation allowance. 81 Even more disturbing, the categorical funding
previously allocated for declining enrollment school districts was
completely eliminated in FY2012.82

77. Id. at 41.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 51 ("State at-risk funding targets children from low-income households
based on federal free lunch criteria.").
80. Id. at 52.
81. CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 4 ("In state FY201 I, nearly
90 percent of the total state-source School Aid Fund revenue is distributed to local
districts through the foundation program.").
82. DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOL EMERGENCY MANAGER, ADOPTED FY2012 OPERATING
BUDGET: CREATING CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE IN
NEIGHBORHOOD 52 (2011) [hereinafter DPS FY2012

EVERY

SCHOOL

AND

EVERY

Budget] ("Due to the fact that
districts across the State of Michigan have experienced significant declines in enrollment,
the State of Michigan has provided some funding proportionate to the size of the school
district in order to combat corresponding declines in state aid revenues. The State of
Michigan budget calls for the elimination of these funds for the FY2012 budget. This
results in a loss of $5.9 million in annual funds to DPS.").
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IV. GOVERNANCE, FINANCE AND COMPETITION IN
THE DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS

A. Governance of the Detroit Public Schools
At least since 1927, state law has classified the Detroit Public
Schools as a school district of the "first class," subjecting it to additional
rights as well as responsibilities.83 Detroit is the only district in the state
to ever fall into this category. "First class" status is recognition that the
educational needs and issues in Detroit are often different from those in
the rest of the state. The challenges of Detroit are more akin to the
challenges of other large urban school districts, like Chicago, Baltimore
and Philadelphia.
In the early years of its existence, even though it was popularly
elected, the Detroit School Board was effectively subject to the control of
city government. 84 This changed at the directive of state law in 1949.
Independence is about the autonomous ability to raise money and make
spending decisions. "The board of education was freed of the
requirement for city approval of budgets and borrowing: it could adopt a
budget, determine what part of the capital plan was to be funded by bond
proceeds, and determine the tax levy required., 85 Adoption of new taxes

still required approval of local 86voters. The Board of Education was
further empowered to incur debt.
The governance structure of the Detroit Public Schools has been the
subject of constant tinkering, debate and reform. In the 1950s and 1960s,
the primary question was decentralization. There were calls to break the

large centralized district serving nearly 300,000 into smaller
administrative units. A 1970 compromise refashioned the school board to
83. CITIZEN'S RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., A HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP
3 (July 1990)
[hereinafter CRC, HISTORY OF THE DETROIT SCHOOL BOARD]. In 1927, the "first class"
designation applied to cities having a population of more than 500,000. Id. This
classification persisted through the School Code of 1955. Id. at 7. In the School Code of
1976, "first class" districts were defined as those consisting of student enrollments of
over 120,000 pupils. id. at 10. The threshold status was subsequently reduced to 100,000
students. CRC, PUBLIC EDUCATION GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 13. After DPS
enrollment fell below the threshold, the State Attorney General ruled in 2009 that Detroit
no longer qualified as a "first class" district. Id.
84. CRC, HISTORY OF THE DETROIT SCHOOL BOARD, supra note 83, at 3 ("Although
members of the board of education were directly elected, the power of the mayor and city
council over the activities of the school district effectively made the public school system
a department of the city.").
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id.
BETWEEN THE DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CITY OF DETROIT
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consist of thirteen members, five of whom would be elected at large,
87
with the remaining eight elected from defined geographic regions.
Furthermore, new regional boards were elected in each of the eight
geographic areas.88 The state School Code of 1976 went further, making
decentralization a state mandate for districts with pupil memberships of
more than 100,000 students and creating eight regional boards within the
district subject to greater city control. 89 A 1981 Detroit voter referendum
ended the decentralization experiment, eliminating the regional boards
and returning administrative control back to a central board of education
independent of city control. 9° The new school board consisted of eleven
9
members, seven elected from defined districts and four elected at-large. '
The traditional governance structure of an autonomous school board
elected by local residents continued until 1999, when the state, once
again, amended the rules governing first class school districts. "[T]he
State stepped in and revised the 1976 State School Code to suspend the
powers of the elected school board in first class school districts and
appoint a school reform board to take over the duties of the elected board
for a minimum five year period. 92 The reform board consisted of seven
members, six appointed by the Mayor of Detroit, in addition to the state
superintendent of public instruction. 93 In November of 2004, Detroit
voters were once again asked to select what form of governance they
wanted for the Detroit Public Schools - the continuation of a variant of
school governance subject to strong mayoral control, or a return to the
traditional structure. 94 Again, Detroit chose95to have a traditional, locally
elected school board run its public schools.
Control was returned to a newly elected Detroit School Board on
January 1, 2006, but this is by no means the end of the story. The Local
Government Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1990 directs the state
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10-12.
CRC, HISTORY OF THE DETROIT SCHOOL BOARD, supra note 83, at 12.
Citizens Research Council of Mich., Proposal E: Form of Governancefor the

Detroit Public Schools, CRC MEMORANDUM, no. 1077, 2004, at 2 [hereinafter CRC,

Proposal E]. "The School Code retained the board's right to adopt a budget and
determine the tax levy to be collected by the City." Id.
92. Id. at 1;see also CRC, REFORM OF K-12 SCHOOL DISTRICT GOVERNANCE, supra
note 17, at 19.
93. CRC, ProposalE,supra note 91, at I.
94. MGT OF AM., DIAGNOSTIC FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT OF DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
FINAL DIAGNOSTIC REPORT 1-2 (2005) ("A feature of Public Act 10 of 1999 was the
requirement that, after five years of using the CEO management model, the question of
retaining the reform Board and the CEO be placed on the ballot.").
95. Id.
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superintendent of public instruction to monitor the financial condition of
local school districts. "In December 2008, State Superintendent Flanagan
declared DPS to be in a state of financial emergency and Governor
Granholm appointed Robert Bob as emergency financial manager of
DPS in March 2009. " 96 Any ambiguity about the authority of the
Emergency Financial Manager over financial matters versus the residual
power of the Board of Education over academic affairs became moot
with the adaption of Public Act 4 in March 2011, which created the new
position of an Emergency Manager with sweeping authority.97 Roy
Roberts was appointed the new Emergency Manager for DPS in May
2011.
Changes did not stop there. In June 2011, Governor Snyder
announced the creation of the Education Achievement System (EAS), a
new state-controlled school district for the state's lowest performing
schools. 98 EAS will be implemented first for failing DPS schools, before
being extended to the rest of the state. This adds yet another layer of
governance over an already fractured and complicated organizational
chart. There are reasons to be concerned about the impact that EAS will
have on DPS. It is estimated that thirty-nine DSP schools will be
transferred into EAS. 99 The financial implications on DPS are the same
as if DPS lost a comparable number of students to thirty-nine new charter
schools. Again, dollars follow students in Michigan. DPS will lose all of
the operating revenue associated with these students, without a
comparable ability to reduce its fixed costs, including the costs
associated with its debt service.'0 It is estimated that DPS already spends
$900 of its per-pupil foundation allowance to pay for debt service.' 0' As
more students exit DPS for EAS, the same costs associated with debt
service and other fixed costs will be spread over a smaller and smaller
number of remaining students. The state bemoans the fact that only fiftyfive percent of allocated DPS resources currently reach the school level.
96. CRC, REFORM OF K-12 SCHOOL DISTRICT GOVERNANCE, supra note 17, at 19.
97. Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Act No. 4, 2011
Mich. Pub. Acts (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1501 et. seq.).
98. Press Release, State of Michigan, Governor, Detroit Public Schools Emergency
Manager Jointly Unveil Dramatic Education Reform Plan to Restructure Failing
Michigan Schools 1 (June 20, 2011)
http://www.emich.edu/eaa/pdf/Michiganrelease-EAA.pdf; see also State of Michigan, Frequently Asked Questions About the
Education Achievement System (undated) [hereinafter State of Michigan, Frequently
Asked Questions], http://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyderFAQ110620education
achievementsystem_356028-7.pdf.
99. State of Michigan, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 98, at 1.
100. Id. at 3 ("The local school district will remain responsible for maintenance, debt
service and facility allocation.").
101. Id. at4.
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EAS could well make this situation even worse for the students who
remain in Detroit schools.
B. Managing FinancialCrises in the Detroit Public Schools: Pastand
Present
The fact that a school district's operating deficit can lead to a state
takeover and the appointment of an Emergency Manager is a recent
phenomenon in Michigan. School financial crises and deficits, however,
are nothing new. How financial problems are addressed depend critically
on the political, economic and social realities that prevail at the time. It is
useful to recall some of these past episodes, as we assess current
financial challenges.
Most of the financial crises of the Detroit Public Schools have been
rooted in the city's broader economic problems, punctuated by conflicts
over politics, race and labor relations.' 0 2 Today, the entire state of
Michigan is undergoing profound economic challenges. These economic
challenges are more serious and of longer standing for the city of Detroit.
The rates of poverty and unemployment in Detroit are amongst the
highest in the nation. Property values have fallen dramatically and tax
delinquency rates are on the rise. This describes the state of affairs in
2012. Tellingly, it also describes the state of affairs in Detroit during the
Great Depression, which had serious implications for the Detroit Public
Schools. 10 3 The 1930s was a time when the schools were under the
authority of city government, making the fiscal fates of the school district
and the city intertwined. The era led to a period of what scholar Jeffrey
Mirel calls "educational retrenchment."' 0 4 While cuts were made across
the board, investments in capital assets and infrastructure suffered the

102. "This study has identified a strong relationship between the health of the local
economy and the general condition of the public schools." JEFFREY MIREL, THE RISE AND
FALL OF AN URBAN SCHOOL SYsTEM: DETROIT, 1907-81 406 (2d ed. 2007). Economic
stresses lead to other forms of stress. Mirel's work also "demonstrate[s] a strong
relationship between levels of funding, the intensity of political conflict, and the viability
of the school system itself." Id. at 401. "One cannot understand the rise and fall of the
Detroit schools without factoring in the effects of shifting levels of funding." Id.
103. See id. at 89 ("Unprecedented levels of unemployment and soaring tax
delinquencies in Detroit not only caused widespread misery and despair among tens of
thousands of residents, but the downward economic spiral also undercut the widely
shared unanimity on school issues. Amid fear and confusion, the powerful interest groups
in Detroit challenged one another in the arena of school politics.").
104. Id. at91.
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most and were the slowest to rebound.105 There were calls to balance the
budget at almost any cost, with unfortunate, long-term consequences.106
"The Detroit public schools began to deteriorate politically, financially,
and educationally as early as the 1930s, a period in which school
leadership, staff, and student populations were overwhelmingly
white." 10 7 Even today, when reading about the state of DPS's capital
facilities, one is struck by the continued dominance of buildings
constructed in the 1920s.1 °8

While problems may have begun in the 1930s, each successive
generation must take responsibility for their own actions and decisions.
Economic problems can trigger political conflict, but Detroit also
illustrates how racial conflict can be the source of budgetary crises. The
best example is the turmoil associated with busing and desegregation in
the early 1970s. "The May [1972] election indicated that the voters
would rather deny the schools any funds than provide money that might
be used for desegregation. ' °9 Voters rejected similar millage proposals
in August and November elections, contributing to "the worst financial
105. Id. at 93 ("Eliminating new buildings and drastically cutting maintenance services
were the only retrenchment actions the board would take that did not generate
controversy.").
106. While speaking to issues beyond just school spending, the words of then-Mayor
Frank Murphy could serve as a cautionary message to today's Emergency Manager. "To
sacrifice everything to balance the budget is fanaticism." MIREL, supra note 102, at 95
(internal citation omitted).
107. Id. at 401.
108. "in Detroit, more than half of all schools were built before 1930, and the average
school is more than 60 years old." CRC & EDUC. POL'Y CTR., THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS
OF PROPOSAL A, supra note 51, at 4. This statement was made in 2004. Detroit passed a
$1.5 billion bond for capital improvements in 1994, with some raising questions about
how the money for capital projects was managed. Citizens Research Council of Mich.,
Detroit Ballot Issues Proposal S: Detroit Public Schools Bond Proposal, CRC
MEMORANDUM, no. 1095, 2009, at 8 [hereinafter CRC, Proposal S] ("A $1.5 billion bond
proposal passed in 1994; recent investigations by the District's inspector general found
overspending for land and building purchases and a 'gross lack of due diligence in
looking after taxpayers' dollars."') (internal citation omitted). In seeking approval of the
1994 bond, it was wrongly estimated that DPS would see a substantial increase in
enrollment in the coming decade. Citizens Research Council of Mich., Detroit School
District $1.5 Billion Bond Proposition, COUNCIL COMMENTS, no. 1032, 1994, at I ("The
school district is projecting an enrollment increase of upwards of 20,000 students by the
year 2000 and major shifts within the city.") In 2009, the citizens of Detroit approved
another $500 million bond for school renovation and construction. CHRISTIN CAVE,
PUBLIC SCHOOL REVITALIZATION
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

IN

DETROIT,

ORGANIZATION

FOR

ECONOMIC

2 (2010) ("'Proposal S' is a bond which takes
advantage of USD 500 million in stimulus dollars that President Barack Obama made
available nationwide to build new schools and modemise existing ones.").
109. MIREL, supra note 102, at 350..
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crisis the school system had faced since the 1930s."" The result was a
seventy million dollar deficit."' In the end, state legislation authorized
DPS to issue seventy million dollar in deficit bonds to be paid for
through increased property taxes that could be implemented without
voter approval."12 The controversy over bussing was just a symptom of
deeper and long-term controversies over race and geography in Detroit.
"In 1966, when the system hit its peak enrollment, it served almost
300,000 students who were about evenly divided between black and
whites. Twenty-four years later, approximately [ninety percent] of the
district's 170,000 students were African American."' 3 The extreme
racial segregation in housing that existed within the Detroit city limits in
the 1940s, 50s and 60s, simply reproduced itself at the metropolitan level
in the 1970s, 80s and 90s, rendering the Detroit Metropolitan area the
most segregated in the nation at the time of the 2000 census. Sadly, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Milliken v. Bradley, a school segregation
case involving the Detroit Public Schools, rendered federal courts
essentially powerless to address this modern form of segregation, one
defined by fractured municipal boundaries.' 14
Driven by the loss of manufacturing jobs, a declining tax base and a
school finance system dependent on local property taxes, financial crises
became endemic parts of the landscape in the 1980s and 1990s. Before
the 1994 adoption of Proposal A, school districts in Michigan were
financed predominately through local property taxes, with state efforts to
ensure greater equity through power equalization programs targeting
districts with low per-pupil property values. When school financing is
tied to local financing, the fate of the local schools is largely tied to the
state of the local economy." 5 The historic forces driving racial
segregation in Southeast Michigan are strongly correlated with forces
driving the economic disintegration of the region. The 1980s was a time
of local and national recession. "The deteriorating economic situation in
the city and state in the early 1980s led to reduced property values, lower
local tax revenues, and less state aid."'" 16 Unlike the 1970s, the financial
stress of the schools was not a sign of lack of voter support for the
110. Id. at 346, 35 1.
111. CRC, HISTORY OF THE DETROIT SCHOOL BOARD, supra note 83, at 9.
112. MIREL, supra note 102 at 352-53.
113. Id. at 413.
114. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
115. MIREL, supra note 102, at 415-16 ("The financial problems that had been
plaguing the Detroit Schools for decades were directly related to the serious economic
and social conditions afflicting the city at large and were certainly one of the contributing
factors to the poor performance of the schools.").
116. Id. at 417.
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schools. Those that remained in Detroit, particularly its AfricanAmerican population, supported their local schools. 17 "[B]etween
out
September 1977, and November 1985, Detroit voters approved 1eight
8
of nine requests by the board for tax revenues or tax increases."'
Despite voter support, DPS ran persistent operating deficits. "[ln
1978 the system began running annual budget deficits that ranged from a
low of $10 million in mid-decade to a high of almost $160 million in
1989."" 9 Once again, DPS had to issue deficit bonds to service the
deficit. "In September of 1989, voters approved an increase of five mills
and the sale of $160 million deficit funding bonds to be repaid from an
unlimited property tax."' 120 In addition to budget deficits, DPS suffered
from falling student enrollments during the same period, declining fifteen
percent between 1983 and 1992.121 On the eve of the adoption of
Proposal A, local property taxes were high, local property values were
low, enrollments were falling and the district was facing structural
deficits, despite receiving a relatively higher level of state aid than higher
property value districts in surrounding areas. I12 With the adoption of
Proposal A in 1994, financing of school operating expenses became a
state responsibility. Unfortunately, the shift in financial responsibility did
little to abate the financial challenges of the Detroit schools. Under
Proposal A, the state, and not the school district, determines the district's
annual operating revenue. Districts are prohibited from supplementing
their budgets from local resources. State-defined revenues of a district
are determined by the product of its foundation allowance and student
enrollment. Recall that Detroit received relatively greater state aid under
the pre-Proposal A regime's power equalization program because of its
117. Id. at 416-17 ("For example, millage elections that often had pitted whites against
blacks in the 1960s and 1970s became calmer and quieter affairs in the 1980s. Not only
did the elections become less contentious, they also became more predictable. Black
Detroiters had consistently supported higher taxes for the schools since the 1940s, and
that support did not waiver as the century wore on.").
118. MIREL, supra note 102 at 417.

119. Id.; see also CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., DETROIT SCHOOL OPERATING
MILLAGE RENEWAL PROPOSAL 5 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter CRC, DETROIT SCHOOL
OPERATING MILLAGE RENEWAL PROPOSAL] (detailing deficits from 1982-1992).
120. CRC, DETROIT SCHOOL OPERATING MILLAGE RENEWAL PROPOSAL, supra

note
119, at4.
121. Id. ("In the ten-year period 1983 through 1992, the number of students in the
Detroit district declined by 31,548, from 213,558 to 182,010.").
122. Id. at 2-3. Between 1983 and 1992, "the Detroit school district ranked very near
the bottom of the 524 K-12 school districts in property tax base (state equalized value or
SEV) per pupil." Id. at 3. In light of the state power equalization program, however,
Detroit was in the top twenty percent of school districts in terms of per-pupil operating
expenditures. Id.. In 1992, local sources accounted for only twenty-four percent of DPS
general fund revenues. Id.
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low property values. This ironically placed Detroit in a category of
school districts that received relatively small real increases in state
funding. At the same time, all districts faced rising retirement and
healthcare expenses for their personnel. Moreover, Detroit faced
relatively higher fixed costs and sharp declines in its enrollment base.
This combination of factors almost guaranteed the continued existence of
chronic structural deficits.
It is important to appreciate the magnitude of these forces. One way
is to examine trends in per-pupil revenues and expenses over the period.
"From FY1995 to FY2007, the DPS foundation allowance increased
from $5,584 per pupil to $7,565 per pupil, a 25.1 percent increase. At the
same time, expenditures per pupil increased 80.2 percent from $7,229 to
$13,382." 123 Averages reveal only a partial picture. The cause of the
growing gap between per-pupil revenues and expenditures was not the
result of costs raising faster than revenue, but rather, in recent years, the
inability to cut costs fast enough in a regime of sharply falling revenues.
Operating revenues are now driven by enrollment. DPS enrollment has
fallen from 168,213 students in FY2000 to an estimated 65,834 students
in FY2012, a decline of over sixty percent. 24 Since every student is
associated with an equivalent share of the state foundation allowance,
DPS has suffered a roughly comparable reduction in state aid over the
same period. Between FY2009 and FY2012 alone, state net
aid to DPS
1 25
has fallen over one-third from $553 million to $363 million.
This is an unprecedented structural crisis. Without additional
external resources to facilitate what is unavoidably a complicated
transition, the only option is radical triage - desperate efforts to cut fixed
costs even faster than revenues drop. DPS has closed over 100 schools
since 2004, with more closures still likely to come.126 DPS has also been
forced to slash the number of teachers it employs. DPS employed 18,747
teachers in FY2003 but only 8,551 teachers in FY2012, a reduction of
fifty-five percent. The district is in a state of free fall with no safety net
in place and no guarantee of a soft landing.
Proposal A was not intended to address any of the structural issues
facing Detroit. Indeed, Proposal A's very design, with its focus an
average per-pupil rates of reimbursement only exacerbates these
problems. It is not surprising then that the post-Proposal A years have
been an era of continued deficits in Detroit. "Data from DPS financial
reports show that in a 13-year period from Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 to
123. CRC, Proposal S, supra note 108, at 5.
124. DPS FY2012 Budget, supra note 82, at 49.

125. Id. at9.
126. CAVE, supra note 108, at 1.
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FY2007, actual DPS revenues exceeded expenditures in only four fiscal
years, the most recent being FY2002."'' 27 The important point is that the
dynamics of the problem are structural and largely transcend issues of
governance. It is ironic that three of the four non-deficit years were from
1997-1999,128 a period when DPS was run by the traditional school board
structure, and a period immediately preceding the state imposed reform
board. The state reform board controlled the district for five years from
2000-2004. In four of the five years, the state reform board ran a budget
deficit, ending with an imbalance of $123 million in FY2004 alone.' 2 9 In
2005, the district issued another $210 million in deficit bonds. 30 Deficits
continued with the return of control to a newly elected local school
board. The deficit was $142 million in FY2008 and $137 million in
FY2009. 3' The State appointed an Emergency Financial Manager for the
District in 2009, but did nothing to change the formula for financing
schools with declining enrollment bases.
DPS is in a new era. The principle source of its deficits are falling
revenues and the corresponding difficulty of making sufficiently
dramatic cuts in fixed costs, all while simultaneously facing the
mounting burden of debt from past operating deficits. DPS will issue
another $200 million in deficit bonds in FY 2012.132 This dynamic, in33
turn, is caused almost exclusively, by declining student enrollments.
Into this already complicated mix, must be added the dynamics of
increased school choice and greater competition triggered by charter
schools.
V. THE FATE OF THE DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS

A. Can the Detroit Public School Survive the Continuationof ProposalA?
An accurate diagnosis of the problem is essential for effective policy
reform. DPS's core problems are structural and financial in nature, not
127. CRC, ProposalS, supra note 108, at 5.
128. MGTOFAM., supra note 94, at 1-3 (Exhibit 1-1).

129. Id. (Exhibit 1-2).
130. CRC, ProposalS, supra note 108, at 4.

131. Id.
132. DPS FY2012 Budget, supra note 82, at 8.
133. The source of many operating deficits is the inability to accurately predict how
fast enrollments, and therefore revenues will fall. "The most significant information
impacting the resources available to DPS is the accuracy in estimating student
enrolment." MGT OF AM., supra note 94, at 4-7. "In both years [FY 2003 and FY2004],
the failure to estimate this source of revenue more accurately was one of the significant
factors in the resulting General Fund deficits." Id. at 4-8.
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issues of governance. Detroit has undergone seven substantial
governance transitions since 1976 - decentralization (1976),
recentralization (1981), state reform board (1999), return to a traditional
school board (2006), Emergency Financial Manager (2009), Emergency
Manager (2011) and the creation of the new Educational Achievement
System (2011). The State financial system has not changed since 1994.
Continued financial distress has been a characteristic of each DPS
governance regime. If anything, the lack of continuity in governance has
likely made it more difficult to manage the underlying financial
problems.
The real sources of DPS's financial problems are defects in Proposal
A itself, exacerbated by changes in demographics and the adoption of
state policies encouraging schools of choice and increased competition
from charter schools. To begin with, Proposal A never leveled the
economic playing field. By failing to include capital costs, it perpetuated
past inequalities associated with low property values, declining tax bases
and aged physical facilities in urban centers. By bifurcating operating
costs from capital costs, no one in the state educational system is
engaging in anything approaching full cost accounting. By freezing
Detroit in the same quintile as many economically prosperous school
districts and failing to let considerations of the differential financial costs
associated with higher cost students affect the calculation of the state
foundation allowance, it ensured that Detroit and other urban school
districts would suffer from what can best be characterized as "benign
neglect" for more than a decade-and-a-half.
The central failing of Proposal A, however, lies in it overly simplistic
per-pupil calculation of a district's operating revenue. Such a flaw can be
papered over in periods of universally raising student enrolments. Such a
flaw, however, becomes fatal in an era of declining enrollments. Again,
this is not rocket science. The flaw is apparent upon reasonable
inspection of the system and has been well documented in the literature
since at least 2003, when statewide student enrollments started to
decline.' 34 The problem can be thought of as a fixed-cost-trap. The
reduction in operating revenue (the entire value of the foundation
allowance associated with that student) is greater than the district's
ability to reduce its fixed costs. In the long run, school districts must
adjust to enrollment changes. Proposal A, however, exacerbates the
difficulty of budgetary adjustments. Spending in declining-enrollment
districts cannot be reduced fast enough to match falling revenues without

134. ARSEN & PLANK, supra note 56.
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damaging educational programs.
illustration of the problem:

35

Arsen and Plank provide an intuitive

[C]onsider the following example based on the Livonia school
district. Suppose the district lost one student from every
elementary classroom and one secondary school student from
every class during a representative class period of the day. This
would reduce enrollments by the equivalent of 743 full-time
students, or a loss of over $5 million to the district at its current
foundation allowance of $8105. Yet under this scenario, district
costs would scarcely be affected by the enrollment declines. In
order to reduce spending in line with the drop in revenue,
services and programs for36 students remaining in the district
would have to be cut back.
This presents a serious financial challenge to local school administrators.
The financial challenge is substantial enough when the declining
enrollment is attributed solely to underlying demographic trends. When
state policies add inter-district choice and charter competition to this
dynamic, the challenges are greatly exacerbated. It is akin to an arsonist
adding an accelerant to a fire. To begin with, school choice and
competition increase the number of departing students, forcing sharper
cuts in existing programs and facilities in the traditional public school.
These cuts decrease the actual and perceived quality of traditional
schools and negatively impact the education of those students who
remain. This, in turn, leads more students to leave and future cuts to be
even more severe in a self-reinforcing, downward spiral. Conversely, the
charter schools and schools of choice receive a bonus payment greater
than the marginal cost associated with educating the new student and are,
therefore, able to spend37 even more revenue in improving educational
programs and services.'
Newer suburban districts receive large infusions of additional
funds to expand their educational offerings, while older urban
communities must make staffing and program cuts. These school
135. Id. at 25.
136. Id.
137. MGT

OF AM.,

supra note 94, at 4-8 ('There are numerous fixed costs in school

districts, and the removal of one or a group of students does not eliminate these fixed
costs. Conversely, in school districts with increasing enrollment, the cost of educating
each additional student is typically less than the per pupil amount received as they are
absorbed into a system based upon formulas for staff allocations and into schools where
the fixed costs will not change dramatically.").
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budgetary changes, in turn, influence households' perceptions of
the condition of local schools. School closures and teacher
layoffs can create negative perceptions that enhance the prospect
that additional families will leave a community, creating a selfreinforcing cycle. For these reasons, Proposal A may
38 not only
respond to suburban sprawl, but encourage it as well. 1
This analysis, offered in 2003, would prove prophetic. Here, the laws of
economics act almost like the laws of physics. The results are
preordained by the structure of the incentives built into the system. No
one should be surprised by the devastating results that they produced.
In FY2003, 191,403 Detroit students received education in a DPS
school, a charter school or a different traditional school district under the
schools of choice program. 39 Given background changes in the
demography of the city, this number fell to 144,435 by FY 2010, a
reduction of nearly twenty-five percent."40 The financial stress created by
this demographic shift alone would be substantial enough under Proposal
A's punitive funding formula. Over the same period, however, DPS
faced increasing pressure from charter schools and schools of choice.
The number of Detroit students attending schools in other traditional
districts (schools of choice) increased from 7,770 in FY2003 to 12,929 in
FY2010, while the number of Detroit students attending charter schools
increased from 27,506 to 45,036.141 As a combined result, the number of
Detroit Students attending DPS fell from 156,127 in FY2003 to only
86,470 in FY2010, nearly forty-five percent, to a point where DPS
educated only sixty percent of the students remaining in city. 142
Under Proposal A, the departure of every student represents a loss of
the entire foundation allowance associated with the student. The winners
win all and the losers lose all. The exodus of these students represents a
substantial loss of resources for the school district.
For example, about 44,000 students who lived in Detroit
attended charter schools in 2006. Together with 8,000 students
attending suburban schools through interdistrict schools of
choice, Detroit Public Schools has lost about one third of its

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

ARSEN & PLANK, supra note 56, at 25.
CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 59.

The entire population of Detroit fell from 926,903 to 713,777 from 2000-2010. Id.
Id.
Id.
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students, amounting to about $400 million in revenue loss
annually to the two choice programs. 143
These numbers have only gotten worse. At its core, this is not a problem
of governance. This is a problem of the state school finance formula in
the context of unprecedented changes in the economics and demography
of the city. DPS is in a state of free fall. It is a vicious downward spiral.
It is no wonder that more than 100 schools have closed since 2004 and
that there is no end currently in sight.
B. Is School Competition Part of the Problem or the Solution?

Does competition make education better or worse for the students
who remain in the Detroit Public Schools? It is important to understand
the frame of this analysis. The inquiry is separate and apart from whether
one thinks that charter schools are good or bad. The analysis focuses on
how the underlying educational "market" is structured and upon the
dynamics of the competitive process itself. Moreover, the focus is upon
those who are left behind in the traditional system. Whether charter
schools provide a better or worse education for students is a separate and
independent concern.'44
In theory (and in properly structured markets), school competition
can increase efficiency and improve educational quality, potentially
measurable by a variety of outcomes-based metrics. What does the
theory require? To begin with, assume that all families have uniform
143. Arsen & Ni, supra note 35, at 31.
144. There are some excellent charter schools in Detroit and future reform efforts
should build off of these lessons. There are also some less than excellent charter schools
in Detroit. This reflects national experience. National evidence suggests that some
charter schools are better than the average traditional schools, some charter schools are
about the same, and some charter schools are worse than average. "The study reveals that
a decent fraction of charter schools, 17 percent, provide superior education opportunities
for their students. Nearly half of the charter schools nationwide have results that are no
different from the local public school options, and over a third, 37 percent, deliver
learning results that are significantly worse than their students would have realized had
they remained in traditional public schools." CRC, NONTRADITIONAL K-12 SCHOOLS,
supra note 6 at 29 (citing CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE
CHOICE: CHARTER PERFORMANCE IN

16

STATES

(2009)). In Michigan, the evidence

suggests that students in charter schools perform slightly better on test scores than
students in the "urban clusters" in which charters disproportionately tend to be located,
but that charter school children perform slightly below the state-wide average overall. Id.
at 32 ("Although PSAs generally outperformed similar districts, they lagged the statewide average in every category tested."). Given that PSA are free to choose where they
locate, this suggests a complicated selection dynamic against the backdrop of geographic
educational disparities that continue under Proposal A.
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preferences for educational quality that can be measured along a simple
vertical dimension (more quality is always better). 45 Let us also assume
that all families have equal abilities to exercise and implement their
educational choices. If traditional schools are not performing optimally
in response to family demands for educational quality, charter schools
will open and compete with them. If charters are perceived to offer better
educational quality, families will choose to send their children to charter
schools. Additional charter schools will open (and existing charters will
grow) so long as there is a perceived gap in the quality between charter
and traditional schools (and between charters themselves). In theory, in
response to the new competition, traditional districts will alter their
previously "inefficient" resource allocations in a manner to improve their
own educational quality. In the end, the theory suggests that competition
will improve the quality of education provided to the students who
remain in the traditional school system.
There are a number of characteristics associated with what are
perceived to be the most effective charter schools. These schools often
have some combination of charismatic principals, smaller classes (lower
student-to-teacher ratios), longer school days and longer school years. 46
For competition to be a legitimate policy option, one must imagine that
traditional schools would have the capacity to respond to charter
competition in a manner that could change their own resource allocations
to duplicate the charter strategies. Once one appreciates the many
constraints that prevent traditional districts from effectively duplicating
successful innovation - union contracts, state regulations and
administrative limitations - one also starts to appreciate the limits of
what competition itself can accomplish in this setting. 147 One response
might be to institute a series of additional educational reforms that afford
traditional schools more flexibility. Ironically, if we were confident in
the set of reforms that would improve educational quality, we could
simply impose these mandates in a regulatory manner within the
traditional system, without the need for competition at all. If, however,
one proceeds with vigorous competition in a world where traditional
schools are not capable of effectively responding to the new stimuli, one
simply builds market distortions in from the beginning.
145. Cf Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and
Non-Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 MICH. J. L. REF. 727, 732-38 (1999)
(modeling competition in hospital markets).
146. CRC, NONTRADITIONAL K-12 SCHOOLS, supra note 6, at 61 ("Successful charter
schools tend to be small, have extended school days and hours, and offer intensive
student support, including tutoring and character education.").
147. Id. at 34 ("There are a number of structural, contractual and political reasons why
traditional schools have not embraced successful models.").
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The theoretical story becomes even more complicated if one assumes
that families have heterogeneous preferences over educational quality different families have different beliefs about what a quality education is
- or that families have differential abilities to evaluate or implement their
choices about what educational quality is and what school they want to
attend. Competition in markets with heterogeneous preferences will
generate differentiated products in response to differential demands
(think about the market for automobiles or soft drinks). Competition will
also segment families with differential abilities into different classes and
categories. Differences in family wealth, motivation, information, access
to transportation and capacity to engage complex bureaucracies will all
the market sorts and stratifies consumers (and
be reflected in how
48
therefore students).
What does the evidence show about the effects of competition? Few
states have had as much experience with charter schools as Michigan.
Moreover, the economic incentives in support of competition in
Michigan (the zero sum game incentives of Proposal A) are amongst the
most intense in the country. 149 This provides an opportunity to
148. Markets can sort consumers along many different dimensions, depending upon
the prevailing incentives and the nature of consumer differences. PSAs are formally
prohibited from selecting students on the basis of student ability or characteristics. Id. at
23. Implicitly, sorting can take place in a number of informal ways. If a PSA offers
traditional programs, but does not offer bilingual education, they are unlikely to attract
linguistic minorities. If DPS offers a full range of programs for special education and a
PSA has no experience or reputation for providing comparable services, it is less likely
that parents with special needs children will send them to charter schools. Indeed, some
evidence suggests that charter competition has already resulted in a sorting process where
greater numbers of disadvantaged students with higher cost needs are left behind in
traditional schools. "Charter schools have a smaller proportion of disabled students than
the state as a whole, and a smaller percentage of special education students in cluster
districts." Id. at 25. Similarly, districts with declining enrolments are also associated with
the highest costs students. "A striking feature of the distribution of high- and low-cost
students across Michigan schools is that it is systematically related to district enrollment
change. Table 12 shows that there is a strong association between the pace of district
enrollment change and the share of students who are high cost. The faster a district loses
students, the larger the increase in the share of remaining students who are poor or who
have disabilities." ARSEN & PLANK, supra note 56, at 27. Even the finding that test scores
in Michigan PSAs are slightly higher than the scores of traditional students in the
remaining "urban clusters" raises questions of causation. Are charter schools doing a
better job at educating students, or are charters implicitly sorting students by ability and
attracting relatively better students. This could take place through a mechanism as
innocuous as the possibility that higher motivated parents may select charter schools, or
that charters may implicitly discriminate against students who lack access to
transportation.
149. Arsen & Ni, supra note 35, at 8 ("[T]he school finance system in Michigan
creates an ideal competitive market for schooling and makes Michigan an especially
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empirically test how traditional school districts have actually responded
to increased competition. David Arsen and Yongmei Ni examined data
from 1994-2006, considering how competition has affected the resources
allocation decision of traditional districts.150 The authors do not find the
"efficient" outcomes predicted by economic theory. Rather than
responding competitively by reallocating resources in a manner that
improves quality, as measured by such variables as instructional
programming, Arsen and Ni found that charter competition was
associated with reduced spending in instructional programs
(quality) and
5
relatively higher spending on administrative functions.' '
What is to be made of this counterintuitive result? It strongly
suggests that competition has no positive effects and indeed may actually
harm the quality of education afforded to students who remain in
traditional public schools. This could either mean that competition does
not work or that public schools administrators are too incompetent (or
highly constrained) to respond rationally. Neither explanation seems
persuasive. Arsen and Ni found another important result. Charter
competition was also associated with increased financial stress for
traditional school districts. "[H]igher levels of charter competition are
strongly associated with declining district fund balances ...Rising levels
of competition of charter competition clearly generate financial pressure
on Michigan [Traditional Public Schools] TPSs."' 152 These findings are
consistent with the claim that Proposal A has created a fixed-cost-trap in
declining enrollment districts, a negative dynamic that charter
competition simply exacerbates. 53 Schools lose revenue and must cut
costs. The cuts come disproportionately in areas of instructional
programming, arguably decreasing the quality of education available for
the students who remain in traditional public schools. Being hamstrung
by falling revenues, traditional school districts are simply unable to
respond to greater competition by increasing educational quality as
predicted in the economic models. "When TPSs in Michigan lose
students to choice schools, they lose the entire per-pupil funding
associated with those students. This loss in revenues generated pressures
important case for studying the effects of charter schools on [traditional public
schools].").
150. Id.
151. Id. at 19 ("So our tentative evidence that charter competition causes TPSs to
allocate a declining share of spending to instructional programs simultaneously implies
that they devote an increasing share of spending to support services.").
152. Id.
153. Id. at 21 ("These results indicate that the loss of students to charter schools has a
significant negative impact on the revenues of Michigan school districts, and that is not
accompanied by a corresponding decrease in their expenditures.").
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for expenditures cuts, which make it harder for districts to continue
providing 54the same quality programs, let alone improve educational
services."1
Independent of the quality of education that charter schools may or
may not provide their own students, the fixed-cost-trap created by
Proposal A means that school competition is likely to be harmful to
students who remain in underfinanced traditional public schools. This
prediction is supported by a further empirical study conducted by Ni on
the effects of charter
competition on student test scores for students in
55
traditional districts.'
My analysis suggests that overall charter school competition has
had a negative impact on student achievement in Michigan's
traditional public schools. The effect is small to negligible in the
short-run, but becomes more substantial in the medium- and
long-run. The negative effect of charter competition is consistent
for both math and reading tests in both 4th and 7th grades and
robust across a range of econometric models and estimations. In
the long-run, for districts where charter schools have drawn
away a significant share of students, the estimated charter
competition decreases their test scores by 0.2 standard
56 deviations
in math and 0.4-0.5 standard deviations in reading.
The effects of competition in any setting depend on the local context and
how the market is structured. The conclusion here is less an incitement
on charter schools per se than it is a continuing indictment on the
perverse incentives created by Proposal A. The reason that competition
has adverse and growing negative effects on educational quality in
center-city school districts facing the highest degree of competition is the
fixed-cost-trap. "Charter competition appears to reinforce a vicious cycle
of enrollment loss, revenue decline, program cuts,' 57lower educational
quality and further enrollment loss in these districts."'

154. Id. at 23.
155. Yongmei Ni, The Impact of Charter Competition on the Efficiency of Traditional
Public Schools: Evidence from Michigan, 28 EcON. OF EDUC. REV.

571

(2009)

(employing state-wide Michigan data from 1994-2004 to assess the impact of charter
competition on math and reading test scores for students who remain in traditional school
districts).
156. Id. at 580.
157. Id.
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C. The Road Ahead: Enabling the Survival of Detroit Public Schools
It is important that this discussion be appropriately calibrated.
Consider a counterfactual where an elected school board retained
governance rights over the Detroit Public Schools since 1998 (or that the
1999 state reform board had remained in control of the district). Further
assume that school financing under Proposal A had been recalibrated in a
manner to more equitably address the challenges of a rapidly declining
enrollment base. Under this scenario, the Detroit Public Schools would
still face a range of serious challenges, from test scores to dropout rates
to labor unions to administrative inefficiencies to school safety that are
common to large urban school districts. Moreover, whatever the system
of governance and finance, Detroit schools would still face the legacies
of deindustrialization, discrimination and regional segregation that
continue to plague Southeast Michigan. These challenges are real and are
not going away anytime soon. That said, the Detroit Public Schools are
not just facing serious endemic challenges, they are facing a real
emergency and not of the type that the state Emergency Manager law is
well positioned to recognize, let alone properly address. There is a
financial crisis, but the crisis is structural in nature, brought about by
flaws in the state financing formula and exacerbated by state policies
encouraging greater competition and schools of choice. 5 8 The
Emergency Manager is asked to adopt the myopic focus of eliminating
an operating deficit in an era of falling revenues and mounting legacy
debt. To do this, the Emergency Manager must relentlessly cut costs
even faster than revenues continue to fall. There is nothing in the
Emergency Manager law to address the structural causes of the financial
crisis or to bring to bear additional resources that might actually improve
the quality of education that DPS students can receive. If the state simply
158. Sadly, rather than recognizing the structural flaws in Proposal A's impact on
districts with declining enrollments, the state legislature continues to adopt policies that
make the problem worse. The weights for calculating the pupil membership have been
changed to 90/10, increasing the financial impact of each new student who leaves the
district. CRC, DISTRIBUTION OF STATE AID, supra note 45, at 30. The special program set
up in 2007 to provide additional resources to districts with declining enrollments (a fund
that was never fully appropriated in the first place) has been eliminated. DPS FY2012
Budget, supra note 82, at 52. Finally, the cap on the number of charter schools has been
removed. Laura Weber, Governor Snyder Signs Law Removing Cap on Michigan Charter
Schools, MICHIGAN RADIO (Dec. 20, 2011), http://michiganradio.org/post/govemorsnyder-signs-law-removing-cap-michigan-charter-schools. This will potentially subject
DPS to unlimited charter competition. At the same time, there have been no significant
countermeasures to ease the financial problems of districts with declining enrollment, nor
has the legislature adopted policies to facilitate a more rational transition to a new
demographic reality.
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intended, sub rosa, to legislate the elimination of traditional public
schools in Detroit, it could hardly think of a more effective vehicle to
accomplish that objective. 159
If the Detroit Public Schools are to have any chance at survival, there
must be a restructuring of the school finance formula. Under Proposal A,
school finance became a state responsibility. The state has an obligation
to finance DPS at a level that reflects the true costs of providing a quality
education to Detroit children. In an era of falling enrollment, this
requires a finance formula that reflects the district's need to spread
unavoidably sticky fixed costs over a smaller number of students,
without jeopardizing the quality of education for those remaining
students. If the state chooses to exacerbate the effects of demographically
driven falling enrollments by encouraging greater charter competition
and school choice, it should ensure that the children left in traditional
schools are "held harmless" from the state's policy choice. A student
who remains in a traditional DPS school should not be made worse off
when another student leaves the district and takes the entire foundation
allowance with her. Students in wealthy suburbs were "held harmless"
with the passage of Proposal A and were permitted, in perpetuity, to
spend more per-pupil than could legally be spent on students in the rest
of the state. Students in central city districts deserve no less. They should
be held harmless under Proposal A for the effects of declining enrollment
and the loss of further students through choice and competition.
The Detroit Public Schools and the entire city of Detroit are
undergoing serious demographic and economic changes. No one can
pretend that the structures that exist today are the best suited to meet
existing needs. Moreover, the structure of the City and the school district
will likely look dramatically different in five or ten years than it looks
today. This is an era of transition. As such, this is a period when issues of
school governance and finance must be specifically designed to manage
159. The preoccupation of constitutional law with intentional forms of discrimination
has left courts virtually powerless to address issues of structural racism. What would it

mean to prove the intent to discriminate against the Detroit Public Schools? In 1994,
despite its flaws, it would be difficult to infer that Proposal A would have such a
disparate impact on DPS or that such an impact would have been intentional. The case
would have been stronger in 2003, with clear shifts in demographic trends and a growing

awareness of the impending problems for a district with declining enrollment. Does a
state intend adverse consequences when it makes no changes in a program that was
neutral upon adoption but begins to have manifested disparate impacts? By 2010, DPS
revenues dictated by Proposal A were in a state of free fall, driven by declining

enrollments and compounded by the growth of charter schools and schools of choice.
What intent can fairly be inferred from the failure to take action at this point? Does the
range of legitimate inferences change a year later when the legislature adopts measures
that compound the crisis rather that ameliorate its effects?
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the transition and to establish an appropriate enabling environment for
the implementation of more sustainable and workable policies for the
future, with the ultimate objective of providing a quality education for
every child born in the city.16° These are not easy problems, and there are
no easy answers.
The principles of effective governance can be clearly stated, even if
their implementation remains problematic.
1) A clear division of labor, authority, and responsibilities with
scope and limit of responsibilities defined;
2) A coherent strategy that can be understood and pursued;
3) Financial and accountability transparency;
4) Representativeness and encouragement for participation;
5) Accountability;
6) Engagement of civic leadership and broad constituencies;
7) A mechanism for different actors in the governance system to
learn their roles; and,
61
8) An agenda focused on student learning.'
When formulating policy that will regulate conduct in complex adaptive
systems, empowering an effective enabling environment is often more
important than the particulars of whatever policy is initially adopted. The
art is to "manage" issues in the face of evolving circumstances.' 62 In that
process, each of these core principles plays a role. What is most lacking
now is coherent governance and financing structures that map onto the
shifting demographic and economic realities of the Detroit school
system.
In addition to the principles for an effective enabling environment,
there are key economic principles of effective financial management.
Full cost accounting is essential for rational long-term decision-making.
If the state is responsible for school finance, it must be responsible for all
160. Particularly in a period of change, policies must be in place to help manage the
transition. ARSEN & PLANK, supra note 56, at 37 ("Providing transitional support to
school districts where enrollment is declining would make it possible for these districts to
respond more thoughtfully and deliberately to revenue reductions over time.").
161. CRC, REFORM OF K- 12 SCHOOL DISTRICT GOVERNANCE, supra note 17, at 39.
162. The principles of learning, adaptation and evolution can be applied more
generally in the school context to encourage the creation of schools and school systems to
learn and improve. See generally PETER SENGE ET AL., SCHOOLS THAT LEARN: A FIFTH
DISCIPLINE FIELDBOOK FOR EDUCATORS, PARENTS AND EVERYONE WHO CARES ABOUT
EDUCATION (2000).
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school finance - operating costs and capital CoStS. 16 3 Furthermore, a
school finance formula should reflect the basic reality that different
students have different needs. The operating budget a district receives
should be calibrated to meeting the full educational needs of its student
population. In addition, basic educational costs vary by region across the
state.164 This reality should be reflected in the state foundational
allowance. Finally, rational decision-making, like competition, always
happens at the margins. The difference between average measures and
marginal measures is drilled into every student who takes a basic
microeconomics class. To base the state's foundation allowance on
average measures and then to layer a system of competition and school
choice over such a flawed premise is difficult to understand or excuse.
As a basis for comparison, one can consider the nuance of
reimbursement measures used in health care programs, such as Medicare,
where hospital costs and patient case-mixes are all subject to careful
adjustments. The chaos, dysfunctionality and injustice that would be
associated with compensating all hospitals the same average amount of
money for each patient they treat anywhere in the country is easy,
although frightening, to imagine. The educational reimbursement
strategy in Michigan (and elsewhere) is crude by comparison. The state
can clearly do better.
One of the most effective mechanisms for linking the principles of a
healthy enabling environment with those of good economics in practice
is a holistic approach to budgeting. Budgeting is more than a process of
strict accounting to make sure that expenses do not exceed revenue.
163. This raises additional issues about the current approach to financing charter
schools as well. Charters receive no separate funds for capital expenses, but, unlike
traditional school districts, charters are able to use operating revenue from the foundation
allowance to pay for capital costs. CRC, NONTRADITIONAL K-12 SCHOOLS, supra note 6,
at 14. Charters can also issue government backed, tax-exempt bonds for capital needs. Id.
at 15. Unfortunately, there is little good data on what charter school capital needs are, or
how they are currently financed. CRC & EDUC. POL'Y CTR., THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF
PROPOSAL A, supra note 51, at 64 ("[T]here is very little public information about the
current state of capital facilities or capital financing in Michigan's charter schools. In the
absence of transparent and comparable data from Michigan's charter schools it is
impossible to know whether state intervention to provide additional support for capital
spending is needed, or whether it would be welcome."). Again, the issue is lack of
coherence and rational planning. No single actor in the state has incentives (or even
adequate information) to consider the real costs or consequences of how educational
competition works or should be structured.
164. See, e.g., CRC, ProposalS,supra note 108, at 5 ("However, DPS faces spending
pressures that are distinct from many other Michigan Districts, including having a high
percentage of low-income students (in fall 2008, 74 percent of DPS students were eligible
for free or reduced price lunch compared to 41 percent of students state-wide) and greater
security needs.").
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Budgeting should be a broad, inclusive process of identifying goals,
making conscious value choices, engaging stakeholders, learning, and
adaptation over time.
The key characteristics of good budgeting make it clear that the
budget process is not simply an exercise in balancing revenues
and expenditures one year at a time, but is strategic in nature,
encompassing a multi-year financial and operating plan that
allocates resources on the basis of identified goals. A good
budget process moves beyond the traditional concept of line item
expenditure control, providing incentives and flexibility to
managers that165can lead to improved program efficiency and
effectiveness.
The DPS budgeting process was faulted in 2004 for failing to live up to
these principles.' 66 Given the obsessive need to cut costs faster than
revenues fall and the myopic focus of the Emergency Manager to
eliminate operating deficits, these same principles have been given only
limited effect in more recent years. More active community involvement
and changing the political environment in which budgeting decisions
take place will be part of the solution. Unfortunately, the insular,
centralization of decision-making associated with the Emergency
Manager model leads in the opposite direction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given Michigan's current system of school finance, it is unlikely that
the Detroit Public Schools can continue to exist in anything like its
traditional form. The combination of high historic fixed costs,
demographically driven declines in enrollment and the calculation of
operating expenses in a manner dictated almost exclusively in terms of a
given year's student enrollment creates a formula that is not sustainable.
The addition of competition (charter schools and schools of choice) to
this unstable framework makes the forces of this self-reinforcing
downward spiral even stronger. The appointment of an Emergency
Manager, whose primary mandate is to avoid operating deficits, which
can only be done by cutting costs faster than revenues fall, simply closes
the loop and seals the fate of the Detroit Public Schools. Ironically, when
the system collapses in upon itself, DPS and the traditional model of
165. MGT OF AM., supra note 94, at 4-2 (quoting from National Advisory Council of
State and Local Budgeting).
166. Id. at 4-3 to 4-4.
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education will bear the brunt of the popular blame. In the aftermath of
the collapse, there are likely to be even more vigorous calls for increased
competition in public education.
Detroit often seems to be the victim of complex, invisible forces the decline of the auto industry, the abandonment of the city's inner-core,
the segregation of the city by race in the 1920s-50s and the resegregation of the entire region by race in the 1970s-90s. The pending
collapse of the Detroit Public Schools might be added to this list, caused
potentially as Justice Stewart in Milliken v Bradley might observe "by
unknown and perhaps unknowable factors."' 67 In truth, these forces are
neither invisible nor unknowable. A careful study of history, sociology,
race, law and economics can reveal how these forces work and enable
one to predict their trajectories and effects in real time. We can choose to
be blind to these forces or we can choose to recognize them for what they
are and grapple with their consequences. The children of Detroit deserve
better than to have state officials stand by while the walls of the public
school system fall around them. Who will take responsibility when the
last public school in the city is closed?

167. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 753 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).

